A Chinese university with close links to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) purchased two of Nvidia’s advanced H200 artificial intelligence processors in October despite being on the US government’s export blacklist, according to procurement records reviewed by Reuters.
Northwestern Polytechnical University acquired the two processors for 874,700 yuan, equivalent to approximately $123,000, through a domestic technology supplier, Shaanxi Bosuan Network Technology. The purchase highlights potential gaps in Washington’s efforts to restrict China’s access to advanced American semiconductor technology.
The university also obtained access to powerful Nvidia processors through rented computing services provided by Chinese companies, raising further questions about the effectiveness of existing export controls.
University Obtained Restricted Chips Through Domestic Suppliers
Based in Xi’an, Northwestern Polytechnical University conducts research involving military aircraft, missiles and satellites. It is part of China’s ‘Seven Sons of National Defense’, a group of universities known for their close connections with the country’s defence and military research sectors.
The US Department of Commerce added the institution to its Entity List in 2001 over its alleged involvement in missile-proliferation activities and military research. Restrictions were tightened in 2019, making licences for exports of controlled US technology to the university subject to a policy of denial in most circumstances.
Despite these restrictions, procurement records show that the university purchased two H200 processors for its management school through a Chinese supplier rather than directly from Nvidia.
The H200 is among Nvidia’s most powerful processors for training and operating advanced AI systems and is subject to US export licensing requirements.
University Also Rented Access to Advanced Nvidia Processors
The procurement records indicate that the university did not rely solely on direct hardware purchases to obtain computing capacity.
During 2026, it entered into five contracts with Chinese companies for access to computing services involving Nvidia processors, including H200, A100 and A800 chips.
Two contracts awarded by its cybersecurity school in January covered seven months of access to servers containing eight H200 processors each. The contracts, valued at 441,700 yuan and 441,000 yuan, were intended for AI model fine-tuning and reinforcement-learning training.
The university also rented access to servers equipped with eight Nvidia A100 processors and eight A800 processors.
In April, another university institute entered into a 375,000-yuan contract for computing services requiring at least 24 A100 processors for structural and fluid-dynamics simulations.
The procurement records provided limited information about where the processors originated or where the rented servers were physically located.
Reuters Identifies Wider Access Across Chinese Institutions
The findings extend beyond Northwestern Polytechnical University.
A Reuters review of 26 Chinese procurement and corporate records from 2026 identified universities and research institutions purchasing US-restricted Nvidia processors or renting access to computing services powered by those chips through domestic suppliers.
Other institutions named in the records include:
- Shenzhen University: Purchased three Nvidia H100 processors for 769,800 yuan in September.
- Wuhan University of Technology: Purchased a server containing an H100 processor for 355,000 yuan in June and four A100 processors in a separate transaction worth 344,000 yuan.
- Beihang University: Purchased four A800 processors for 489,000 yuan in April. The institution has close links to China’s aerospace and defence industries.
- University of Chinese Academy of Sciences: Procurement announcements identified suppliers selected to provide computing services using restricted Nvidia H800 and A800 processors.
The records suggest that domestic suppliers and cloud-computing arrangements are providing Chinese institutions with alternative routes to advanced computing resources, even where direct exports face restrictions.
US Export Controls Under Growing Scrutiny
The purchases come amid increasing debate in Washington over China’s access to advanced AI processors and the effectiveness of US export restrictions.
The Trump administration began allowing certain H200 exports to China on a case-by-case basis in January 2026. However, that policy did not remove the separate restrictions applicable to institutions on the Entity List, including Northwestern Polytechnical University.
The licensing framework also includes safeguards intended to prevent blacklisted organisations and military end-users from remotely accessing chips exported under the policy.
US lawmakers have called for stronger oversight, including chip-tracking requirements and additional scrutiny of exports to China. Concerns centre on the possibility that advanced AI computing capacity could support military applications such as weapons design, intelligence analysis and defence modernisation.
Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang has argued that continued US sales to China would help preserve American technological leadership and keep Chinese customers dependent on US technology. However, some lawmakers believe access to advanced processors could accelerate China’s military and AI capabilities.
Nvidia and University Do Not Respond to Requests for Comment
Northwestern Polytechnical University, Nvidia and the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, which oversees export controls, did not respond to Reuters’ requests for comment.
Reuters also reported that it could not determine contact details for Shaanxi Bosuan Network Technology, the supplier involved in the university’s direct H200 purchase.
The findings highlight the challenges faced by US authorities in monitoring the movement and use of advanced semiconductor technology through third-party suppliers and computing-service arrangements.
As competition between Washington and Beijing intensifies in artificial intelligence and semiconductor development, the ability to enforce export restrictions across complex supply chains is likely to remain a major policy concern.
Disclaimer: This report has been editorially prepared using publicly available information and official statements. Readers are advised to refer to official announcements for further details.
Author
About the Author
